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The arrival of refugees at a country’s border, especially under the circumstances of mass 
population influxes, has become one of the fundamental challenges faced by nation-
states of both the northern and southern hemispheres. As the world’s refugee numbers 
climb beyond the sixty million people threshold, and with a death toll of well over thirty 
thousand migrants in Mediterranean waters alone over the past five years, to claim that 
this is an acute problem of our time – would be an understatement. And nowhere is the 
problem more poignantly experienced, by the refugees, the state’s law enforcement au-
thorities, and the observing media, than at national border posts. The sight of stranded 
asylum seekers, whether caught between national border fences or intercepted at sea by 
naval patrol vessels, has become a disturbingly common feature of news bulletins. The 
imagery thrust of the sight of a refugeed family with children, as they cry out in their 
attempt to transgress a national border-fence, recently erected by the armed forces of a 
neighbouring country, lies in the inherent ontological clash between refugees and the 
state whose territory they are trying to enter. 
The border crossing presents an Archimedes point where all three forces: the refugee, 
the recipient state, and international law collide. From the historian’s vantagepoint, this 
Archimeden three-force conjunction is a novelty. To be sure, both refugees (as people 
fleeing persecution), and the nation-state (which is also coming of age) are not new enti-
ties. Yet the erection of quasi-impenetrable borders along many nation-states’ frontiers, 
which physically restrict the movement of peoples, is probably unprecedented from a 
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historical viewpoint.1 Although rulers in the past could have cherished the ambition to 
obstruct the entry of unwanted migrants, they did not possess the administrative capac-
ity to enforce such a decision. 
The second novelty, concerns the rise of international law, especially since its global and 
all-encompassing phase, following the creation of the United Nations (UN) after World 
War II. In 1960, the eminent French intellectual Raymond Aron elaborated upon the 
novel aspects which the creation of the UN brought about, as it unified the field of 
diplomacy: 
‘What do I mean by Universal history? To begin with, I mean the unification of the field 
of diplomacy. China and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States, France and 
Britain, Germany and Italy, India and Ghana - all these states now belong to a single 
unique system. What happens on the coasts of China is not without influence on relations 
between Europe and the United States, or between the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion. Never before have so many states recognized one another’s right to exist; never before 
have Europe and Asia, Africa, and America felt so close. What the main countries once 
did in Europe and Asia, the main countries of today do across the five continents.2
This unification of the diplomatic space was achieved in no small part by the rise and 
codification of international legal instruments which have asserted legal purviews far be-
yond domestic, or even bi-lateral engagements. As Aristide Zolberg and Gérard Noiriel 
have demonstrated, the rise of the refugee as a modern administrative category is inti-
mately tied with the rising capacity and willingness of 20th-century-states to ‘protect their 
nation’ by controlling immigration. This nationalizing process dovetailed inter-state co-
operation which codified legal instruments to exempt refugees from a strictly nationalist 
treatment.3 The process of codification of refugee protections, and the corresponding 
responsibility of states was not linear. Yet with the coming into force of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention (1954), the 1954 Convention on Statelessness (came into force in 1960) 
and the final adoption of the Refugee Convention’s Secondary Protocol (1967), the in-
ternational legal reality of refugee protection had come full circle.4 
The current clash between refugees and obstinate Nation-states who refuse entry at their 
border fences and territorial waters, is a clash between one age-old phenomenon (refu-
gees), and two new global conditions (tightly controlled borders and international refu-
gee law). The objective of the contributions in this COMPARATIV issue is to diachroni-
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cally explore the development of this clash and its attempted legal regulation through the 
international refugee regime. 
A rudimentary (and grossly oversimplified) periodization of the process of globalization, 
as seen through evolution of the international communities’ organs could be broken 
down into three consecutive waves of development. The first wave, probably from the 
second half of the 19th century until after the creation of the UN, centred around the 
creation of all-encompassing international diplomatic platforms; fragmentary in their 
first instance (under the League of Nations), and which became global under the UN. 
The second wave (1945 – 1967) saw the birth (and subsequent rise in international 
importance), of regional organizations, as in the Council of Europe, the Organization 
of American States, the EEC (later – the EU), and the Organization of African Unity 
(later – the African Union). The creation of Regional Human Rights Courts, such as 
European Court for Human Rights, the Inter-American Court for Human Rights and 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, from the early 1960s to 2006, might 
well be counted as representatives of a third phase of this globalization process. The con-
tributions in this volume broadly follow these institutional waves of globalization which 
brought about our so-called ‘international community’ and its organs. 
The Contributions to this Volume: An Historical Account  
of Refugee Protection
The first two contributions of this volume explore the clash between refugees and nation-
state sovereignty, during the naissance of international space under the establishment of 
the League of Nations – a period in which the parallel development of modern interna-
tional law took place. In her chapter on Russian refugees, Elizabeth White explores the 
origins of our current international refugee regime, through a detailed examination of 
the actions of the League of Nation’s first High Commissioner for Refugees – Fridtjof 
Nansen on their behalf. From the mid-1920s, as their options for repatriation dimin-
ished and they were rendered stateless, Russian refugees gradually triggered the crea-
tion of both the international community’s technical apparatus for refugees (‘the Nansen 
office’), along with their newly-acquired international legal identity as in the ‘Nansen 
Passport’ they subsequently received. This re-bestowing of a legal identity upon every 
individual refugee, who now had her or his name stamped on an international serially-
numbered identification document, provided the possibility for host nation-states to be-
gin processing sojourn requests by refugees, which hitherto had no way to be recognized 
by the receiving nation-states. White concludes her study with the creation of the first 
international refugee Convention of 1933, which safeguarded opportunities for Russian 
refugees to work and live in their country of asylum. 
While other foreigners became in this era of rising national protectionism subservient 
to national citizens, the Russian refugees reconquered to a certain extent the status of 
denizens, common to all foreigners during the 19th century. While the state denied them 
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political rights, it did enable them and their offspring to build their lives on equitable 
terms with those of national citizens. The mostly Western European states who joined 
the international regime for Russian refugees as codified in 1933 came to accept their 
responsibility for these refugees, and thus instigated the non refoulement principle for 
the very first time. The protests within the state administration against this self-limita-
tion of state power indicated that it was already seen back then as a clear limitation of 
state sovereignty. 
In his contribution concerning the Jewish and political refugees who fled the Third Re-
ich, Frank Caestecker explores how states reacted to an ongoing refugee crisis. In contrast 
to the Russian refugee crisis where states agreed to international obligations after the 
refugee crisis, in the case of the Reich’s refugees, policy makers intervened before and 
during this crisis. As the arrival of these refugees coincided a deep recession, interstate 
cooperation was necessary to alleviate the economic burden they caused. The adoption 
of the principle of the first country of asylum aimed at interstate burden sharing. In 
contrast with Russian refugees who were first recognized internationally and only later 
received domestic recognition, the refugees from Nazi Germany were the first group of 
immigrants to be admitted domestically under the legal category of asylum seekers. States 
could now work within their bureaucratic machineries to make a distinction between 
refugees as defined by national and international law and other immigrants, in terms of 
the procedural processing of asylum requests, and in terms of international cooperation 
for burden-sharing. 
From 1938 onwards the flight of Jewish refugees was perceived by authorities as a mass 
population displacement. As opposition to such a perception was too weak, also due to 
the sheer numbers of this mass population flow, and with the international community 
showing little solidarity with the Jewish victims, the Nazi state succeeded in torpedoing 
international pro-refugee efforts. Absence of interstate cooperation created an unseen 
chaos at the borders, which triggered the totally illiberal manner in which European 
states recreated themselves , so as to restore order at their borders, to the detriment of 
refugees. The few states who still granted protection to Jewish refugees did so solely due 
to domestic considerations as international refugee law had evaporated.
The adoption of the 1951 Convention represents a watershed moment in the history 
of refugee law, being the first instrument that truly universalized the rights of refugees 
versus nation states. These rights were considerably strengthened with the adoption of 
the non-refoulement principle, which entailed restrictions over border policy. In his 
contribution, Gilad Ben-Nun substantiates the argument that the drafters of the 1951 
Refugee Convention understood the implications of their decision to endorse the non 
refoulement principle in its most stringent prohibitive form, as it imposed upon states 
the negative duty of not returning refugees back into the hands of their tormentors “in 
any manner whatsoever”. The formulation of non refoulement by the drafters of the 
1951 Refugee Convention in hoc sensu, established a fundamental structural limitation 
upon nation-state sovereignty, in that a state was from now on limited in exercising its 
unconditional right over its borders. This contribution also substantiates the view that 
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the drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention indeed intended for the non refoulement 
protection to apply under conditions of mass population flows. The differences between 
the US Supreme Court’s reading of non refoulement and that of the European Court for 
Human Rights stems mostly from methodological shortcomings when examining the 
travaux préparatoires of international treaties. These shortcomings are elaborated upon, 
and guidelines are subsequently provided so as to avoid them. 
In its early days, UNHCR did not become the robust international agency which the 
refugee lobby had fought for, as it lacked both proper funding and a long-term man-
date.5 It however succeeded to become the international institution in the field of refugee 
management. At the very start it presented itself as the organization best qualified to 
determine the eligibility of asylum seekers and could conquer institutional space. From 
the early 1950s onwards European states were ready to yield more of their sovereignty to 
buttress UNHCR as the harbinger of the international refugee regime. Both the Neth-
erlands and Belgium subcontracted their eligibility policy to UNHCR, while UNHCR 
became the junior partner in Italian eligibility decisions and in the French appeal proce-
dure.6 The ratification of the Refugee Convention and its incorporation into the domes-
tic law of many European countries promoted greater accountability and oversight at the 
domestic level. Even the UK, who for decades refused to integrate the 1951 Convention 
into its domestic legal system, also finally came around and in 1993 finally domestically 
adopted the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act. 
Notwithstanding, many states have resisted any qualification to their national sover-
eignty when concerned with refugees. In Western Europe, national sovereignty was to be 
challenged even further by the European Convention of Human Right drafted in 1950 
by the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, whose competence 
to enforce the treaty has often pursued an even more activist policy in this domain, has 
proven to be a restraint of sorts over national immigration policies.7 
In his contribution, Irial Glynn comparatively examines the fundamentally-different re-
sponses of Italy and Australia to the incoming influx of boat-fairing refugees towards 
their shores in recent decades. The growing number of refugees on the high seas in recent 
years, in Mediterranean, Australian, and Caribbean waters is seen as one of the great 
humanitarian challenges of our time. In contrast to land-locked refugees, the perils at sea 
mean an immanent risk of almost sudden death to the people who board these derelict 
sea vessels in their desperate attempt to arrive at safer shores. The key determining factor 
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steps up to this humanitarian challenge while Australia succumbs to it, lies in the im-
portant moderating and standard-setting role played by the European Court for Human 
Rights (ECHR), whose regional legal competencies outweigh those of Italy’s domestic 
courts, in favour of universalist legal standards for refugee protection. The absence of an 
Asian regional equivalent to the ECHR has enabled Australia to unabatingly continue 
its disregard for its legal obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, as it continues 
to override its international legal obligations in favour of its limitlessly unchecked sov-
ereignty. In some cases, this Australian conduct even brings it to exercise its sovereignty 
exterritorialy (beyond its own national maritime boundaries), as its coast guard vessels 
intercept refugee sea fairing vessels in international waters. This is done with the overt 
intention of pre-empting refugees from having the right to petition Australian domestic 
courts, since their refoulement takes place far and beyond Australian geo-legal bounda-
ries. 
The debate as to whether non-refoulement is indeed a structural qualifier of nation-
state sovereignty, especially when a state is faced with mass population flows, cannot 
be divorced from contemporary historical ironies. For if one observes the conduct of 
states today, one immediately notices similarities between the inhumane contemporary 
conduct of countries such as Australia and the US, with their parallel conduct during the 
drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention, over sixty years ago.
State Sovereignty, and the Contemporary Pressures upon  
the International Refugee Regime 
With the Syrian refugee crisis entering its seventh year as these lines are being written, it 
is worth noting that the countries in Syria’s direct geographical proximity have accepted 
mass flows of Syrian refugees into their territories without exception.8 And none – not 
Jordan, which has received 650,000 refugees into its own population of 6.5 million (a 
10 per cent increase); or Lebanon, which has seen 1 million refugees swell its population 
of 4.5 million (22 per cent); or Turkey, with 2.8 million refugees in a population of 75 
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That Jordan’s GDP per capita is less than half that of Hungary, or that Lebanon’s is 
less than half of that of the Slovak Republic, has not caused them to enact any of the 
draconic administrative measures that these European countries have put in place to 
prevent Syrian refugees, recognized as such by UNHCR, from entering their territory.10 
If anything, the remarks of the Hungarian and Slovak premiers are starkly reminiscent of 
the Canadian Foreign Minister’s reaction vis-à-vis Jewish refugees on board the St. Louis 
in 1939. Asked how many Jewish refugees Canada was prepared to accommodate, he 
emphatically replied that “none – were already too many .”
That it was easier for Canada to keep out Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany than for 
Belgium since the ocean separates Germany from the former but not the latter is plati-
tude. Nevertheless, one must not underestimate that the allowance by any country for 
refugees to transgress its national borders as they flee for their lives – is a choicely act 
which that State undertakes.  States can also choose to adhere to the morally-repulsive 
conduct of closing their borders and standing idle – as these refugees perish upon their 
border-fences. This in fact was the conduct which most European States exercised vis-
à-vis Jewish refugees from the summer of 1938 onwards. It is currently the conduct of 
Southeast Asian nations who border Myanmar - such as Bangladesh who is currently 
blocking Rohingya Muslims from entering its territory, through active border refoule-
ment and “push back” operations.11  There can be little doubt that it is easier for Hun-
gary or the Slovak republic to turn away Syrian refugees primarily because these refugees 
are not being turned away directly into a war-zone, but rather onto the shoulders of other 
refugee-accommodating states (Greece, Turkey, Macedonia, Serbia etc.). 
Yet this should not in any way diminish the positive moral awe which must be accorded 
to countries such as Jordan and Turkey when these countries unequivocally accord their 
welcome to Syrian refugees. Both Jordan and Turkey have periodically been at war with 
Syria. Both are heavily centralized states with an extremely strong security apparatus, 
and both have impenetrable borders with Syria which are fenced, land-mined and under 
constant security-force surveillance.  And both have not turned back a single Syrian flee-
ing for her or his life. Moreover, both countries ‘cough up the cash’ which is constantly 
missing from UNHCR contributions, which at virtually any given moment cover no 
more than 50-60 percent of the real humanitarian needs of this newly incoming popula-
tion. The sociological question as to why certain countries (and their societies) opt for 
such feats of humanitarianism while others don’t is of paramount importance, deserves 
far more research than we currently have, and is unfortunately beyond the scope of this 
volume. What is it about France that has driven it to accept half a million refugees who 
fled the Spanish civil war in February 1939? What is it about Great Britain who in the 
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conduct when it welcomed large groups of Austrian and German Jews in the late 1930s? 
What is it about Turkey which granted the exiled Jews from Spain asylum across the 
board in 1492, and five hundred years later does the same with Syrian refugees? Why do 
these states- who also have dark stains in their past (Turkey with the Armenians, Great 
Britain and Kenya, France and Algeria) react in this way repeatedly under these circum-
stances? These are pertinent questions which beg further research.
Nowadays, however, much of the hope in refugee protection comes from the Global 
South. The admirable German reaction towards Syrian refugees is dwarfed in terms of its 
humanitarian extent when compared with countries such as Ethiopia and South Africa. 
As of 2015, Ethiopia housed the largest population of refugees (650,000) on the African 
continent.12  Yet contrary to Germany, which welcomed its Syrian refugees in 2015 in 
addition to those from the Yugoslavian civil war in the early 1990s, Ethiopia – which has 
been housing African refugees for more than a quarter of a century (ever since the first 
Somali refugee flows of 1991) is one hundred times poorer than Germany.13 As for South 
Africa, it is the first country in the world to have officially recognized harsh economic 
conditions as a legitimate ground for the granting of asylum, hosting Zimbabwean refu-
gees for a decade now. It has recently lengthened Zimbabwean residence visas under its 
extended Zimbabwean Dispensation Program.14  Rather than locking up refugees in 
camps, the South African Minister of Home Affairs congratulated his own country for 
not administering an obligatory encampment policy for refugees.15
A View Forward 
As the world observes what Ian Buruma has recently referred to as ‘The end of the An-
glo-American order’ which was intuitively associated with the legislation of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and other such international humanitarian instruments, human 
rights advocates should ponder to what extent the commonly-held image of the West as 
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It is now almost a century since the world began to accommodate refugees as a special 
category of migrants, in terms of the legal tools designed to regulate their relations vis-
à-vis host states, both at the international and the domestic spheres. The process of re-
ciprocal domestic recognitions by individual states followed the lead of the international 
sphere, and not the other way around. France might have been the first country to grant 
the right of asylum back in its constitution of 1792, but as the late Aristide Zolberg 
demonstrated – France represented the exception in states’ behaviour, rather than the 
norm.17 It took most western countries several decades to step up to the human rights 
benchmarks acceptable at the international level. The intense political struggle, mainly 
during the interwar period, for a more generous immigration policy for refugees yielded 
the durable solution exemplified in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
In Western countries refugee protection became highly formalized which was concomi-
tant with the strong state presence in society and economy. Industrial western societies 
with their organized capitalism aimed at reconciling the different interests of labour, 
middle classes and capital. Their immigration policy aimed to align immigration strictly 
with labour needs and a cultural status quo. Refugee policy, which became a side door, 
provided for admission of sensitive cases, so that stopping other people at the border 
or deporting them from the country itself would not be contested. Refugee policy was 
mainly directed at improving the efficiency of migration management of the highly-or-
ganized nation-states. 
The infrastructural power of the state is much less developed in the global South.18 There-
for the need for a formal refugee policy is much less felt in these more autonomous socie-
ties. A case in point is their largely informal economy which can easily absorb refugees. 
While the formal refugee policy in western countries was mainly developed for domestic 
reasons this offspring of the protectionist immigration policy became embedded in an 
international refugee regime, along with a system that secured burden sharing by adher-
ing to the notion of first country of asylum. If necessary, the burden of first countries 
of asylum was alleviated by resettlement programs. The nearly two hundred thousand 
Hungarians who fled to Austria in 1956 had by 1958 nearly all been resettled elsewhere. 
In recent years, while formally still adhering to the international refugee regime, Western 
states have taken up a stringently legalistic approach towards refugee protection for do-
mestic use only and largely withdrew from international commitments. 
In contrast, regional developments – primarily in the Global South point to a much 
faster adoption of the human rights rationale enshrined in principles such as non-re-
foulement by the countries of decolonized Africa, The Arab World and even Southern 
Asia. When one considers the fact that the Organization of African Unity’s Convention 
on refugees was only adopted in 1969, at a time when most African countries were not 
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ism such as Angola and Mozambique), the conduct of countries such as Ethiopia and 
South Africa becomes all the more laudable. The fact that the League of Arab States (‘the 
Arab League’) has never drafted an international legal instrument for refugees, yet that 
this has not prevented its members from rendering assistance to Palestinian refugees 
(now seven decades and four generations in the making), or to current Syrian refugees, 
sheds a new light on the comparative conduct of these states vis-à-vis some of their 
northern counterparts.19 
The question as to why Ethiopia continues to welcome recurring waves of refugees from 
Somalia, South Sudan and Eritrea, or why Jordan continues to receive Syrian refugees 
notwithstanding the 1970 attempt by many Palestinian refugees to topple the regime of 
the very state that welcomed them, is well beyond the scope of this volume. Neverthe-
less, one is bound to consider the hypothesis that these recurring welcomes, in face of the 
appalling record of countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, has something to do with 
the high cultural - indeed the religious value which many African and Middle Eastern 
societies attribute to the accordance of hospitality and protection to the vulnerable mi-
grant stranger.20 
At the end of a century of contestation, between the international attempts to help 
refugees, and the nation-states’ attempts to limit their unwanted entry, after both the 
international and the domestic refugee categories have been codified, the challenge posed 
before the state by a refugee who clandestinely attempts to transgress its national border-
fence, in search of sanctuary – is alive and kicking. The conundrum faced by the state, 
of either receiving that refugee -  thus accepting a limitation to its ultimate sovereign 
right to determine who comes within its boundary confines, or repelling that refugee 
thus guarding its sovereign exclusivity at the expense of its moral standing – is as acute 
as ever.
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